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Monetary policy implementation in China 
Marvin Goodfriend and Eswar Prasad
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1. Introduction 
China’s rising prominence in the world economy has meant that the efficacy of its 
macroeconomic management has taken on considerable importance, not just from a 
domestic perspective but also from broader regional and international perspectives. In this 
paper, we review the functioning of one of the key tools of macroeconomic management – 
monetary policy. Although China’s government deficit and public debt to GDP ratios are quite 
low by international standards, the existence of large contingent fiscal liabilities implies that 
there may be less room for maneuver on fiscal policy. Thus, monetary policy has a 
particularly important role to play in buffering the economy from domestic and external 
shocks. 
We begin, in Section II, by reviewing developments in the exchange rate and capital control 
regimes. Although China has had a de facto fixed exchange rate regime for about a decade 
now, the existence of capital controls has meant that there is still some room for monetary 
policy manoeuvre, but this room tends to be rather limited in practice. Indeed, in recent 
years, controlling credit and investment growth has become especially complicated due to 
the large inflows of speculative capital that have been testing the exchange rate peg to the 
US dollar (and, since July 2005, the tightly managed peg to a currency basket that looks to 
all intents and purposes like a continued peg to the dollar). 
Having an independent monetary policy is obviously desirable for this policy tool to be 
effective. But a move towards greater exchange rate flexibility is not the solution by itself. 
Indeed, enhancing the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism poses difficult 
challenges independent of the constraints related to the exchange rate regime. Principal 
among these is the reform of the financial system, since that is the conduit through which 
monetary policy has an influence on economic activity. Indeed, financial sector reform is one 
of the most important and challenging tasks facing Chinese policymakers. In Section 3, we 
review the current state of the financial system, with particular emphasis on the banking 
system, which still dominates China’s financial landscape. 
We then review the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) approach to the implementation of 
monetary policy. Given the weaknesses in the monetary transmission mechanism, the 
authorities have relied on a variety of direct and indirect instruments. In Section 4, we 
discuss these instruments, problems in using them and their relative effectiveness. 
In Section 5, we discuss the direction in which, in our view, the monetary policy framework 
should be developed. We argue that there may be merit to using a low inflation objective as 
the nominal anchor. Our view is that making low inflation the main objective of monetary 
policy is the most reliable way to enable the PBC to stabilise domestic inflation and 
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employment against macroeconomic shocks. An inflation objective would provide a firm and 
credible nominal anchor that would contribute to overall macroeconomic stability, which in 
turn would provide the basis for sustained employment growth and help safeguard financial 
stability. 
This framework could accommodate a continued role for the monitoring and management of 
a monetary aggregate (and credit) by the PBC, thereby allowing for continuity in the 
operational approach to monetary policy. However, our view is that money would not 
constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor for an economy that is undergoing major 
structural changes and financial innovations. We should also emphasise that we are not 
necessarily advocating a full-fledged inflation targeting regime, although this could serve as a 
useful long-term goal. 
There are of course a number of institutional reforms that will be required before this 
framework can be put in place. We discuss some of the basic reforms that we think are 
essential, and may be adequate, to putting in place this alternative nominal anchor in the 
next few years. Exchange rate flexibility is a basic and essential requirement for the 
operation of independent monetary policy. However, while full modernisation of the banking 
system will no doubt take a long time, a more modest set of reforms that would make the 
banks robust to interest rate fluctuations would be adequate to enable the PBC to credibly 
commit to a low inflation objective as a nominal anchor. 
2.  The exchange rate regime and capital controls 
China had a dual exchange rate regime in the early 1990s. The exchange rate regime was 
unified in 1994 and, since 1995, the renminbi has been maintained at a fixed parity relative to 
the US dollar. This regime was in principle classified as a managed float since a narrow 
fluctuation band around the US dollar was permitted. In practice, however, the renminbi has 
been maintained at an essentially fixed level relative to the US dollar since the mid-1990s 
(Figure 1, top panel). Fluctuations in the real and nominal effective exchange rates of the 
renminbi have tended to be driven by fluctuations in the exchange rate of the US dollar 
relative to other major currencies. 
On 21 July 2005, the renminbi was revalued by 2.1% relative to the US dollar, and the 
government announced that its value would henceforth be set with reference to a basket of 
currencies, although neither the currency composition of the basket nor the basket weights 
have been publicly disclosed.
2 The new regime also allows for fluctuations of up to 0.3% 
around the reference rate. In principle, this could mean that the exchange rate is allowed to 
drift up (or down) by 0.3% each day, which could amount to a significant appreciation (or 
depreciation) over a period of time. In practice, however, the renminbi has barely moved 
against the dollar since July 2005 (Figure 1, lower panel); its lack of movement is also not 
consistent with variations that may have been expected based on various plausible 
assumptions about the currency composition of the reference basket. Thus, the regime still 
qualifies as a de facto fixed exchange rate. 
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Given the nature of the regime and a number of institutional constraints, the foreign 
exchange markets have remained relatively thin and underdeveloped. The number of 
participants in the foreign exchange market, the China Foreign Exchange Trading System 
(CFETS), was limited to a handful including some of the state commercial banks (SCBs). In 
fact, these banks acted as clearing agents for many of the trades that they settled directly 
without the transactions ever reaching the CFETS. In 2004, trading volume on the CFETS 
was only about $210 billion (as a reference point, this amounts to less than 20% of the value 
of China’s external trade in that year). But this setup also made the mechanics of tightly 
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managing the exchange rate easier for the PBC since it could correct any deviations from the 
central parity relatively quickly and easily. 
More recently, the government has taken a number of measures to improve the operations of 
the CFETS and increase the volume of trading. This includes permitting more financial firms 
to participate in the CFETS, giving the interbank market a greater role in determining the 
central parity rate and encouraging the development of new financial instruments for hedging 
foreign exchange risk. 
The ability of the government to maintain a stable exchange rate is in part linked to the 
maintenance of capital controls. While China has actively encouraged inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) over the last decade and a half, it has kept other parts of the capital 
account – both for inflows and outflows – relatively closed (see Prasad and Wei (2005)). 
Overseas borrowing by domestic corporates and financial firms has been actively 
discouraged, resulting in China’s external debt amounting to only about 25% of GDP, while 
portfolio equity flows have been restricted in both directions. 
Nevertheless, the capital account has become de facto more open over time. One indication 
of this phenomenon is the big role played in recent years by net errors and omissions – the 
category in the balance of payments that captures unrecorded capital flows (that could take 
place via current account as well as capital account transactions). As shown in Figure 2, the 
surge in the pace of reserve accumulation over the period 2001-04 is closely related to the 
substantial change in non-FDI capital flows, which largely reflect changes in the errors and 
omissions category. In 2005, however, the continued surge in reserve accumulation appears 
to have been driven by a surge in the current account balance, with the trade surplus itself 
rising to over $100 billion. 
 
Figure 2 
Components of reserve accumulation 
Notes: The figures for foreign exchange reserves include the amounts used for bank recapitalisations: 
$45 billion in December 2003, $15 billion in April 2005, and $5 billion in September 2005, as well as a $6 
billion fx swap that PBC conducted with domestic banks in November 2005. 
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The increasing de facto openness of the capital account means that the independence of 
China’s monetary policy, which is already quite limited because of the fixed exchange rate 
regime, is being eroded further. This has important implications for the conduct of monetary 
policy, which we return to later. 
3.  The financial system 
In this section, we present a broad overview of the current state of monetary, banking, and 
financial markets in China. Virtually all of the formal sector financial intermediation in China 
takes place through the state-owned banking system, with the total deposit base amounting 
to about 200% of GDP.
3 Equity and bond markets remain rather underdeveloped, although 
the authorities are actively trying to change this concentrated structure of the financial 
system by promoting the restructuring and development of equity and bond markets. 
In recent years, bank financing has accounted for more than four fifths of total funding 
provided through the formal financial sector. Stock market capitalisation amounts to only 
about 30% of GDP. With only a small number of enterprises permitted to list and about two 
thirds of shares in listed enterprises held by the state and not traded, the stock market does 
not play a major role in intermediating household saving into corporate investment. Efforts to 
reduce the overhang of non-trades shares have depressed stock price indexes, which have 
declined since 2000, notwithstanding the strong performance of the economy. The bond 
market is small and dominated by treasury and financial bonds, with corporate bonds barely 
on the radar screen. Thus, the banking system is crucial to the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, even more so in China than in other countries that may have more balanced 
financial market development. 
The Chinese banking system is dominated by four large SCBs, which together account for 
more than half of the total assets of all banking institutions.
4 The joint stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs) have expanded the size of their balance sheets quite rapidly in recent years 
and now account for about 15% of total banking system assets. There are 12 JSCBs, 
including the Bank of Communications, which recently did an IPO. The 89 city commercial 
banks account for about 5% of banking system assets. Then there are three policy banks 
that have explicit directed lending mandates – China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank 
of China and Agricultural Development Bank of China. The banking system is rounded out by 
a number of other smaller banks including rural credit cooperatives, urban credit 
cooperatives, trust and investment companies and finance companies. 
Recent reform efforts have been largely focused on the SCBs (steps to reform the credit 
cooperatives are also under way). The shareholding reform of the four SCBs was initiated in 
September 2003. Carve-outs of non-performing loans (NPLs) from the banks to asset 
management companies, recapitalisations using foreign exchange reserves, and other 
reform efforts have led to substantial improvements in the capital strength, asset quality and 
operating results of these banks. Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank (CCB) 
now have NPL ratios below 5% (as a ratio to total loans in each of these banks) and capital 
adequacy ratios of over 8%, with adequate provisioning for loan losses based on the five-tier 
classification of loans. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is also close to 
achieving this capital adequacy threshold. 
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China has also sought to actively involve foreign strategic investors in the bank restructuring 
process and views these investors as important agents for promoting governance reforms in 
the state banks (for a discussion and assessment of this strategy, see Hope and Hu (2005)). 
Nevertheless, the government has made it clear that it has no plans to privatise or otherwise 
cede control of any of the domestic banks in the foreseeable future. 
Interbank markets are crucial for the effective implementation of monetary policy. China has 
already put in place some of the institutional arrangements necessary for the PBC to 
effectively manage aggregate bank reserves in the short run. It has created a deep, liquid 
market in PBC bills through which the central bank can manage aggregate bank reserves 
effectively with open market operations. There is also an active repo market that the PBC 
uses to manage the supply of reserves on a day-to-day basis. The infrastructure for 
borrowing or lending reserves among banks in the interbank market on the basis of repos or 
on an uncollateralised basis at the CHIBOR rate is well established. The level of interbank 
rates is determined flexibly to clear the market for borrowing and lending reserves, and the 
spread between the rates varies with such things as the nature of collateral backing the loan. 
This positive assessment of the functioning of interbank markets must, however, be balanced 
against some major weaknesses that still persist – including the relative thinness and 
illiquidity of interbank markets, the fact that major players may have excessive market power, 
and the potential that non-bank participants have to destabilise the market. 
4. Monetary  policy  implementation – instruments and constraints 
The primary instruments of monetary policy used by the PBC include open market 
operations, the rediscount rate and reserve requirements. These are complemented by 
instructive credit plans, credit policy and “window guidance”, indicating the important role still 
played by non-market approaches in the implementation of monetary policy. Thus, the PBC 
uses a mix of indirect market instruments and more direct methods to control the volume and 
composition of credit flows (see Xie and Lou (2001) and Yi (2001) for more details). 
Xie (2004) notes that the traditional approach has been to use monetary base as the 
operational target and money supply as the intermediate target. More recently, the PBC has 
been using growth rates of both money and bank lending as explicit intermediate targets. 
The relationship of these aggregates to real activity has not necessarily stayed stable over 
time. Furthermore, with the growth rate of M2 consistently being a few percentage points 
higher than nominal GDP growth over the last few years, there has been a trend decline in 
velocity, complicating things further. Yet, given their easy observability, targets for growth of 
these two aggregates have become an important device for the PBC to signal its monetary 
policy intentions and its assessments of growth and inflation prospects. 
Base deposit and lending rates of the state banks have traditionally been set by the PBC, but 
only with prior approval of the State Council. On 1 January 2004, the PBC increased the 
flexibility in the lending rate to 0.9-1.7 times the base rate for commercial banks and urban 
credit cooperatives and 0.9-2.0 times the base rate for rural credit cooperatives. Financial 
institutions were also given the freedom to determine lending rates for individual borrowers 
based on their risk profiles and other characteristics, rather than being constrained by 
guidelines on pricing loans related solely to size and ownership structure of borrowers. On 
29 October 2004, the ceiling on lending rates was scrapped altogether (except for urban and 
rural credit cooperatives).
5 
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Reserve requirements have recently been used quite extensively as a monetary policy 
instrument. The required reserve ratio (required reserves expressed as a ratio to a bank’s 
deposits) was reduced from 13% during 1988-98 to 6% in 1999, in part to allow banks to 
better manage their funds. This ratio was raised to 7% in 2003 and further to 7.5% in 2004, 
as part of a series of measures intended to control lending growth amidst concerns about the 
rapid pace of overall credit growth and potential overheating in the economy. 
In addition to changes in reserve requirements, differentiated reserve requirements were 
introduced in April 2004. This affected second-tier banks, including the joint stock 
commercial banks that had accounted for a significant part of the surge in lending growth in 
2003. Those banks in this category that did not meet certain standards in terms of the quality 
of their loan portfolios and capital adequacy were subjected to a reserve requirement of 8%, 
half a percentage point higher than the standard required reserve ratio. Rural and urban 
credit cooperatives were exempt from this higher reserve requirement. 
Notwithstanding the apparently wide range of instruments available to the PBC, there are 
three major factors that have complicated the implementation of monetary policy in China. 
These include the exchange rate regime, institutional weaknesses in the financial and 
corporate sectors, and the large stocks of excess reserves that banks maintain at the PBC. 
We discuss these in turn. 
4.1  The exchange rate regime 
This rigidity of the exchange rate has constrained monetary policy independence by making 
it difficult for the PBC to use interest rates as a monetary policy instrument to meet domestic 
policy objectives. The complications created by a fixed exchange rate have been most 
evident in the remarkably rapid build-up of international reserves since 2001, when the 
renminbi began to come under appreciation pressures. Gross international reserves stood at 
819 billion US dollars at end-2005 (excluding the amounts used for bank recapitalisations in 
2003 and 2005). As noted earlier, the spike in the pace of reserve accumulation during 2001-
04 is largely attributable to a surge in speculative capital inflows (through both official and 
unofficial channels), although a rapid expansion in the trade surplus (to over $100 billion) 
seems to have become a more important factor during 2005. 
Until 2002, government bonds had been used as the primary instrument for sterilisation of 
foreign inflows. Some conversion to central bank (CB) bills took place in late 2002, when the 
stock of government bonds available for repo transactions had shrunk to very low levels. The 
first full-fledged auction of new CB bills took place in May 2003. CB bills have now become 
the primary instrument for sterilisation of capital inflows and, with the surge in inflows, the 
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The fraction of reserves sterilised by the central bank has varied over the last few years, and 
it is not even straightforward to assess exactly how much sterilisation has taken place.
6 By 
and large, the PBC seems to have had little trouble soaking up liquidity using CB bills. While 
a few analysts have taken the low levels of sterilisation as signalling, at least in some 
periods, potential problems in sterilisation operations, this is far from obvious. The rate of 
credit growth has, after all, come down significantly relative to the very high levels observed 
in 2003-04. Furthermore, the interest rate on CB bills remains quite low. At the end of 2005, 
the yield on three-month and one-year PBC bills was below 2%, more than two percentage 
points below comparable US Treasury rates. 
Given the success that the PBC has had in sterilising foreign exchange inflows and 
containing inflation to date, is there any reason to question the sustainability of the current 
policy regime in which the tightly managed exchange rate serves as the nominal anchor for 
monetary policy? We believe there are significant costs and risks to maintaining the current 
regime, especially if it requires continued sterilisation of capital inflows on a massive scale. 
First, consider the issue of sustainability. The current configuration of domestic and foreign 
interest rates implies that the PBC actually “makes money” from its acquisition of dollar 
assets, implying that the traditional quasi-fiscal costs of sterilisation are apparently 
nonexistent. However, the PBC’s investment in dollar assets involves exchange rate risk (if 
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the RMB were to appreciate against the dollar) as well as interest rate risk (if the industrial 
country yield curve, which determines returns on China’s reserve holdings, were to shift up 
further). The PBC’s assumption of these risks onto its balance sheet in effect exposes the 
Chinese taxpayers to substantial fiscal losses if things go wrong. 
There is another important (but hidden) cost of defending the tightly managed exchange rate 
system separate from the risks associated with potential capital losses due to movements in 
the exchange rate or shifts in industrial country interest rates. Controls on capital outflows 
and domestic financial repression are required to help maintain at low levels the rate of 
interest paid on central bank bills. To maintain bank profits, the government must then 
mandate low interest rates on deposits. Thus, the cost of these distortions is ultimately borne 
by depositors in the banking system – which includes most households, given the lack of 
alternative investment opportunities – in the form of very low real rates of return on their 
deposits (Prasad and Ranjan (2005)). 
However, incomplete sterilisation is costly in terms of macroeconomic adjustment, too. If 
capital inflows are significant, and especially if they are expected to persist, banks would be 
likely to react to the relaxation of reserve positions and the expected persistent fall in 
interbank rates by significantly increasing loan growth. Moral suasion would only be 
temporarily effective in deterring the expansion of loans in this case. In the absence of any 
expected response of the PBC, inflation expectations would rise, nominal interest rates 
would reflect an increased inflation premium, and more capital would eventually be attracted 
into the country by the prospect of higher RMB yields and the likelihood of an eventual 
appreciation of the RMB. In short, incomplete sterilisation is costly because it risks creating 
an inflation scare and a recession when followed by the inevitable tightening of monetary 
policy to restore exchange rate stability and credibility for low inflation. 
Somewhat paradoxically, another equally valid concern is that credit growth may be leading 
to excess capacity and eventual deflationary pressures in the future. The recent investment 
boom is occurring not so much as a consequence of monetary policy, however, but because 
the government has implicitly encouraged bank funding of high investment to substitute for 
the low Chinese consumption in aggregate demand. Of course, the saving rate may be 
unusually high in China because the public is nervous about the sustainability of stable 
growth due to the monetary policy and banking sector problems that are the focus of our 
paper. 
The main point is that a continuation of monetary policy geared to maintaining a tightly 
managed foreign exchange rate as the nominal anchor carries substantial risks. This policy 
option comes, with major risks in terms of deadweight costs associated with excess/ 
inefficient investment (see Goldstein and Lardy (2004)), fiscal costs to Chinese taxpayers, or 
an inflation scare followed by a recession. In different circumstances, the tightly managed 
foreign exchange rate could precipitate the risk of a deflationary recession. 
4.2  Institutional weaknesses in the financial system 
The Chinese state-owned banking system had laboured under the legacy of directed lending 
until the late 1990s. Progress has been made since then in terms of improving the 
commercial orientation of some of the key parts of the banking sector, and significant strides 
have been made in improving banking supervision and regulation. But Chinese banks are 
still far from being robust commercially driven financial entities. 
Notwithstanding the termination of the official policy of directed lending to state enterprises, 
the imperative of allowing for unviable state enterprises to continue their operations has 
continued to sap the banks, which are implicitly forced to continue financing the operation of 
these enterprises. And the lack of alternative investment opportunities for households and 
alternative sources of financing for firms has meant that the banking sector has had less 
incentive to improve its performance. 34  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Thus, an important priority is to transform the banking system from an arm of off-budget 
fiscal policy using captive savings of households that support transfers to state enterprises 
into a banking system that can direct credit to its most valued uses given correct interest rate 
signals. This means that ultimately banks must compete for funds freely in deposit, managed 
liability and interbank markets against other credit opportunities made available to 
households and firms. This is a necessary condition for pricing loans efficiently. 
Of course, other necessary conditions must be met for banks to provide efficient 
intermediation – management/owners must have their own capital at risk with the freedom to 
direct credit to borrowers of their choice without pressure or incentive to make loans favoured 
by government. And banks must have systems in place to evaluate creditworthiness and to 
price loans appropriately. Finally, a reasonably competitive banking system is necessary so 
that packages of loan rates and covenants follow closely the risk-adjusted cost of making 
loans. 
Putting in place the components of a modern banking system as described above is not only 
difficult, but could entail considerable risks during the transition. This is especially so when 
one recognises that the transition must be supervised and regulated with great care to 
preserve the public’s confidence in the banks and guard against moral hazard problems 
associated with the explicit or implicit insurance of bank deposits by the government. 
Moreover, even if all of the above conditions were met, the consequences of the legacy of 
directed lending would further complicate the transition. 
One additional point worth mentioning is that state enterprises that do make profits are 
generally not required to pay dividends to the state, so they can use retained earnings to 
finance requirements for working capital and new investments, making them less sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the liberalisation of lending 
rates has not resulted in substantially more lending going to the private sector. In part, this is 
because the incentive structure is such that lending to state enterprises is still seen by bank 
managers and loan officers as safer, especially from a reputational perspective. Ultimately, 
more basic reforms will be required to get the incentives right, and it will then be essential to 
provide appropriate supervisory and regulatory frameworks to avoid moral hazard and 
agency problems. 
4.3 Excess  reserves 
A major complication in using the reserve requirement ratio as an instrument of monetary 
policy is that the state banks, especially the SCBs, have tended to maintain substantial 
amounts of excess reserves at the PBC. Some of these excess reserves are believed to be 
held for interbank settlement and liquidity management purposes, but it is difficult to discern 
how large the banks’ perceived need for excess reserves for this purpose is. The PBC clearly 
has a concern that a significant amount of excess reserves makes the banks less sensitive to 
changes in its policy interest rates in the interbank market, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of another of its instruments. Indeed, the existence of substantial excess 
reserves makes policy instruments such as the rediscount rate and reserve requirements not 
only less effective but also less predictable in their outcomes. 
These concerns led the PBC to reduce the rate of remuneration on excess reserves to 
1.62% in December 2003 and further to 0.99% in April 2005 (compared to the unchanged 
rate on required reserves of 1.89%). With these cuts in the rate of remuneration and at the 
encouragement of the PBC, the amount of excess reserves maintained by banks (as a ratio 
to total deposits in the banking system) has declined from 7.3% at the end of 2000 to about 
3% at end-2005 (Figure 4). Although lower than in the past, this level of excess reserves 




Excess reserves ratio 
As a percentage of total deposits in the banking system 
 
Sources: CEIC; authors’ calculations. 
 
How can all of these complications be dealt with in setting up an effective monetary policy 
framework that can respond flexibly to shocks? We now turn to our view of what nominal 
anchor would serve China best and how these complications could be handled in making the 
transition to a new nominal anchor. 
5.  An alternative nominal anchor
7 
Our view is that making low inflation the main objective of monetary policy is the most 
reliable way to enable the PBC to stabilise domestic inflation and employment against 
macroeconomic shocks. It is by providing a firm and credible nominal anchor that the PBC 
can best contribute to overall macroeconomic stability, which would provide the basis for 
sustained employment growth and help safeguard financial stability. 
An inflation objective has the virtues of flexibility and easy communicability. It can also 
accommodate fluctuations in productivity growth and changing relationships between 
monetary or credit aggregates and inflation, all of which are relevant considerations for a 
developing economy. This framework could accommodate a continued role for the 
monitoring and management of a monetary aggregate (and credit) by the PBC, thereby 
allowing for continuity in the operational approach to monetary policy. However, our view is 
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that money would not constitute a good standalone nominal anchor since the rate of money 
growth consistent with a stable level of inflation is likely to be highly variable. We are also not 
advocating a full-fledged inflation targeting regime in the foreseeable future since there may 
be various technical and institutional constraints that would hinder its effective operation. 
What would it take to put in place a low inflation objective as an effective nominal anchor? 
Exchange rate flexibility is of course a prerequisite for an independent monetary policy 
regime. It will also be necessary to put in place banking reforms to facilitate the effective 
transmission of monetary policy and to enable the banking system to endure the fluctuations 
in interest rates necessary to stabilise inflation. Finally, effective communications on the part 
of the PBC will play an important role in the effective operation of monetary policy under the 
new nominal anchor. 
Even though the modernisation of the banking system will take years to complete, a relatively 
minimal set of banking reforms essential for the transmission of monetary policy could be 
accomplished in a much shorter period. We believe that China could put in place a basic set 
of financial sector reforms and regulations that would enable the adoption of an inflation 
objective as a nominal anchor. These reforms would help give the PBC unconditional control 
of the monetary base and aggregate bank reserves. Reforms and regulations would also be 
needed to ensure that banks could withstand the financial stresses resulting from fluctuations 
in interest rates that may be required from time to time to sustain price stability. We believe 
that this minimal set of reforms could be put in place in the next few years and would be 
adequate for instituting a low inflation objective. 
China has already taken a number of steps to modernise its banking system, but much 
remains to be done. The question is how much more modernisation is needed to support 
independent monetary policy. China has already created some of the institutional flexibility 
necessary for the PBC to transmit monetary policy actions effectively to aggregate demand – 
through a liquid bank reserves market, and with fully flexible, competitively determined 
interbank interest rates. China has allowed deposit and lending rates to be more responsive 
to the interbank rate; although there continues to be a ceiling on deposit rates and a floor on 
lending rates. A relaxation of these remaining rate restrictions would help complete the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. We believe that it only remains for the PBC to be 
willing and able to exploit the monetary transmission mechanism to move short-term interest 
rates in a wide range to target inflation effectively. In particular, it is not necessary to fully 
modernise China’s banking system before moving to independent monetary policy. It is 
necessary, however, to make the banking and exchange rate system robust to interest rate 
fluctuations. 
One of the main priorities towards this end is that Chinese banking authorities must complete 
the removal of NPLs from Chinese banks in order to fortify the banking system against 
flexible interest rate policy. Those banks that are relatively more encumbered by a legacy of 
NPLs than others would be at a competitive disadvantage in offering interest on deposits, 
especially if the PBC was required to raise short-term interest rates to stabilise inflation, 
thereby putting weaker banks in financial distress. The prospect of such financial distress 
would threaten the entire banking system and could make the PBC reluctant to raise interest 
rates to fight inflation. 
NPLs must, however, be removed in a way that avoids moral hazard problems, ie, that gives 
the management of recapitalised banks the incentive to manage banks prudently. It is 
critically important that the removal of NPLs is accompanied by improved bank supervision 
and regulation. Furthermore, the government must obviate the potential problem of new 
lending likely to end up as NPLs since, even if explicitly directed lending is forbidden, 
incentives may be skewed toward implicitly directed lending if bank managers perceive 
political pressure to lend to the state sector, or for that matter, to favoured sectors or projects 
elsewhere in the economy. Bank supervisors and regulators must give managers protection 
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that owners and managers are given strong incentives to manage their banks prudently on 
commercial considerations. To facilitate these reforms, the government should undertake 
any future transfers to state-owned enterprises outside the banking system. 
Even if these reforms were put in place, it would take a long time for Chinese banks to 
modernise, ie, to learn to price loans efficiently according to risk, and to design and monitor 
loan covenants efficiently. Nevertheless, we believe that Chinese monetary policy can be 
effectively transmitted even through a banking system that may not be fully efficient, as long 
as the banking system is financially robust against interest rate fluctuations and Chinese 
exchange rate policy does not inhibit monetary policy actions. 
We noted in Section 4 that the level of excess reserves maintained by banks at the PBC is 
high and variable. Moreover, Chinese banks are said to react to changes in aggregate 
reserve supply by absorbing or releasing excess reserves to some degree, short-circuiting 
somewhat the PBC’s leverage to influence pressure on reserve positions. Wouldn’t such 
behaviour greatly hinder the adoption of independent monetary policy in China? We think 
not. 
The relative insensitivity of Chinese banks to incremental changes in PBC-managed 
pressure on reserve positions is to be expected given the fact that banks know that the PBC 
has little leeway with which to pursue independent monetary policy when the foreign 
exchange rate has to be tightly managed. The banks are thus understandably reluctant to 
respond much to an incremental tightening or easing of reserve pressures by the PBC 
because they doubt there can be much follow-through. In the absence of the managed 
foreign exchange constraint, the PBC could overcome such complications with more 
aggressive, sustained open market operations that credibly moved interbank rates in a wider 
range. 
In any case, two reforms could be used to stabilise and reduce excess reserve demand. 
First, the PBC should in general refrain from discretionary reserve requirement adjustments 
because these induce volatility in excess reserve demand as banks prepare for and try to 
anticipate changes in reserve requirements. Second, the PBC should encourage banks to 
economise on excess reserves by discontinuing the payment of interest on them. To the 
extent that the banking system chooses to reduce excess reserves, the PBC should be 
prepared to soak them up by selling PBC bills. 
It may take time for excess reserve demand in China to fall to minimums held by banks in 
those countries with the most modern banking systems and more efficient payment 
settlement mechanisms. Nevertheless, as the Chinese financial system develops, we would 
expect the precautionary demand for excess reserves to decline as it has elsewhere, thereby 
improving the transmission of monetary policy. 
An effective communication strategy, to convey clearly to the market the PBC’s monetary 
policy intentions, would be an important element of a new monetary policy framework. The 
PBC must also have comprehensive, reliable and timely statistics on money, banking, 
financial markets and the macroeconomy in China to guide independent monetary policy. 
6. Concluding  thoughts 
An independent and effective monetary policy is essential for effective macroeconomic 
management in China. The Chinese economy is becoming increasingly developed and 
market-oriented, necessitating a shift from inflexible direct methods of allocating credit and 
implementing monetary policy, to flexible indirect methods using a liberalised banking system 
and the management of bank reserves by the central bank. 
Although China has a de facto fixed exchange rate, the existence of capital controls – even 
though they may not be fully effective – implies that there is some room for monetary policy 38  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
independence. But the financial repression and capital controls needed to maintain positive 
cash flow in the banks has affected bank efficiency and has other serious costs. Indeed, the 
maintenance of a tightly managed foreign exchange rate as the nominal anchor for monetary 
policy has subjected the PBC to having to deal with enormous capital inflows in recent years 
that threaten to overwhelm its control of aggregate bank reserves. 
In this paper, we have provided a description of China’s financial and banking systems, 
monetary policy operations and exchange rate regime. We have also tried to make the case 
for replacing the current exchange rate regime with a low inflation objective as the nominal 
anchor. This would, in our view, be the best way to enable the PBC to stabilise domestic 
inflation and employment against macroeconomic shocks. This framework could 
accommodate a continued role for the monitoring and management of a monetary aggregate 
(and credit) by the PBC, thereby allowing for continuity in the operational approach to 
monetary policy. However, our view is that money would not constitute a good stand-alone 
nominal anchor. We are also not advocating a full-fledged inflation targeting regime since the 
requirements for that regime are much greater and may not be realistic over the next few 
years. 
A robust and efficient financial sector would greatly improve the effectiveness of monetary 
policy transmission. The full modernisation of China’s banking system is of course a distant 
goal. But we have argued that a relatively modest set of reforms, principally to make the 
banking system robust to large interest rate fluctuations, would be sufficient to put in place 
this alternative nominal anchor. Along with the current favourable domestic circumstances – 
high growth and low inflation – this strengthens the case for moving to a new nominal anchor 
relatively soon. 
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